Asia was a sideshow in international relations (IR) theory of the 1970s, reflected in urgent appeals to bring together the separate traditions of area studies and social science analysis coming from the few area specialists entering the disciplines but feeling like outcastes. In three developments, above all, observers felt ill-served by their artificial separation. The Sino-Soviet split, the nature of the Vietnam War, and the modernization of Japan posed challenges that many recognized were not adequately addressed. As these issues aroused appeals for better theories-comparative communism, comparisons of revolutions and liberation movements, and comparative modernizationa basis was established for an upsurge in scholarship on Asia and in theorizing about it. All three of these theoretical pursuits, however, proceeded haltingly in the face of doubts on how to analyze East Asian differences from the West and their impact on IR. If comparative analyses gained a following, it did not mean that IR theory took them seriously, not only due to their shortcomings but also due to anti-area studies biases.
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Discussions of all three issues fell short of academic rigor. Writings on the schism in the Communist movement were rarely well informed about internal debates in the Soviet Union or China, relying on English-language translations, especially of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and repeating simplistic assumptions from one or the other side of the divide rather than assessing both sides at once. Analysis of the Vietnam War became highly politicized, leading to entrenched assumptions on both sides that generally overlooked the regional picture. Finally, social scientists did not, as a rule, take Japan's modernization seriously, as if arguments about a unique process linked to cultural background were just the illusions of area specialists. If one or another of these themes drew serious attention, specialists usually narrowed the topic with little regard to IR theory, and generalists stuck to the theory without delving deeply into the facts of the situation. Scholars overcame this divide slowly.
The reality of far-reaching developments could not be brushed aside: the war in Vietnam reshaped the US role in Asia, the SinoSoviet split led diplomacy to gain more importance than in any recent decade, and Japan's unrelenting rise drew predictions that it could become a superpower or at least shake up how analysts understood a leading power to behave. Fundamental questions about IR theory were finally being centered on Asia.
The Cold War remained at a high pitch in the 1970s, echoed in theories on IR and in comparisons of states with powerful IR implications. Yet, in addition to Vietnam's impact on extending research into newly developing countries and Japan's influence on widening coverage of Asian dynamism, China's sudden shifts in direction aroused great interest. In comparison to the initial quarter century of the postwar era, Asia gained far more prominence. This was a breakthrough decade, but that did not lead to IR theories effective in covering the themes deemed most urgent by area experts.
Three events punctuated the IR narrative of the 1970s against a solid backdrop of economic miracles in maritime Asia and economic stagnation in continental Asia. The defining development in great power relations was the two-stage normalization of Sino-US relations in contrast to the multistage deterioration of US-Soviet relations and the abject failure to make progress in overcoming the Sino-Soviet split. Second, the turning point in the postwar hegemonic US position in maritime Asia was the defeat in the Vietnam War, as it increasingly acknowledged Japan's growing economic role in Southeast Asia while elements of Japan's modernization model spread along with its "flying geese formation" to South Korea and elsewhere in the region. Third, East Asia was shaken by the back-to-back Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia amid a genocidal implosion and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, exposing a chaotic state in continental Asia while highlighting Sino-US common interests. China's sudden changes raised the stakes for theory as great and middle powers alike jockeyed for advantage.
Theoretical preferences of the 1950s-1960s came under scrutiny. For modernization theory, the challenges from Asia ranged from
